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I. INTRODUCTION
In the "new economy" driven by the telecommunications industry, the
Federal Communications Commission ('FCC" or "Commission") is a busy
agency. Given the myriad legal issues faced daily by Commission
decisionmakers and the lack of perfect clarity in major communications
* B.A., University of Virginia, 1988; ID., University of Virginia, 1994; Senior Legal
Advisor and Chief of Staff to Commissioner Furchtgott-Roth. Ms. Walker is a former law
clerk to Associate Justice Clarence Thomas of the United States Supreme Court and The
Honorable J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Chief Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit.
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legislation,' one might be willing to overlook a few legal missteps here and
there by the FCC. In one area of the law, however, the public can and
should require a first-rate agency record: regulation of communications
media without regard to the viewpoint expressed via that media, as required
by basic First Amendment principle.
This Article argues that the FCC should actively avoid viewpoint
discrimination in its adjudication and rulemaking where the relevant statute
does not require it. Part ITdescribes the constitutional disfavor with which
courts regard viewpoint distinctions. Part III explains why regulators
reasonably can be expected to avoid viewpoint-discriminatory methods.
Part IV studies cases in which the FCC adopted policies that turn on the
viewpoints of regulated parties. Part V concludes that the FCC can and
should avoid such constitutionally suspect classifications in the future.
I.

THE UNIQUELY DISFAVORED STATUS OF ViEWPONT-BASED
LAWS IN FIRST AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE

First Amendment jurisprudence is by no means the clearest or least
controversial body of law in the land. Some basic tenets, however, are
readily ascertainable and generally accepted. Specifically, most courts and
commentators consider governmental discrimination on the basis of
viewpoint-that is, treating one group differently than another simply
because of its particular perspective on a given topic-to be a classic and
especially egregious violation of the Free Speech Clause of the First
Amendment. As the Supreme Court has explained, "[w]hen the government
targets not [just] subject matter, but particular views taken by speakers2 on a
subject, the violation of the First Amendment is all the more blatant."
Viewpoint-based rules so offend First Amendment values that
1. See AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 397 (1999) ("It would be gross
understatement to say that the Telecommunications Act of 1996 is not a model of clarity. It
is in many important respects a model of ambiguity or indeed even self-contradiction").
2. Rosenberger v. Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995); see also Consol. Edison Co.
v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 530, 546 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("A
regulation of speech that is motivated by nothing more than a desire to curtail expression of
a particular point of view on controversial issues of general interest is the purest example of
a 'law abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press."); First Nat'l Bank of Boston v.
Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 784-86 (1978) (explaining that "the legislature is constitutionally
disqualified from dictating the subjects about which persons may speak" but "especially
where... the legislature's suppression of speech suggests an attempt to give one side of a
debatable public question an advantage in expressing its views to the people, the First
Amendment is plainly offended."); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 581 (1965) (Black, L,
concurring) ("[Viewpoint-based regulation is] censorship in a most odious form."); M.
Heins, Viewpoint Discrimination,24 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 99, 101 (1996) (describing
Court's "focused emphasis on viewpoint discrimination as the ultimate First Amendment
evil").
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uniquely stringent constitutional standards govern their use. For example,
government cannot censor wholly unprotected and otherwise proscribable
speech based on its like or dislike of a particular message expressed by
such speech;3 government may make certain content-based distinctions
within categories of unprotected speech, however.4 Similarly, in nonpublic
fora, where government decisionmakers have wide latitude to regulate
speech, they still may not bar speakers on the basis of their viewpoints?
Finally, although the Court has sanctioned in broad terms governmental
judgments on funding when based on content or even a certain philosophy
of a given subject, 6 its more recent cases suggest a contrary trend. These
cases clearly establish (to the dismay of some Justices) that the ban on
viewpoint discrimination fully applies in the context of funding.7 As these
various constitutional standards reflect, viewpoint-based rules occupy the
3. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992) (holding that
government may not regulate otherwise unprotected "fighting words" based on hostility or
favoritism towards the underlying message they contain); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S.
747, 763 (1982) (upholding a child pornography statute but noting that there was no
"question here of censoring a particular literary theme").
4. See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 387-88 (stating that content-based distinctions in classes of
unprotected speech are permissible when the distinctions relate to "the very reason the entire
class of speech at issue is proscribable!' or when a subclass of speech is regulated based on
its secondary effects).
5. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983)
(stating government may restrict access-to a nonpublic forum "as long as the regulation on
speech is reasonable and not an effort to suppress expression merely because public officials
oppose the speaker's view"). This singular aversion against viewpoint discrimination
applies in the context of limited public fora as well, where distinctions based on viewpoint
are far harder to defend than ones grounded in content. See Rosenberger,515 U.S. at 829-30
(explaining the "distinction between, on the one hand, content discrimination, which may be
permissible if it preserves the purpose of that limited forum, and, on the other hand,
viewpoint discrimination, which is presumed impermissible when directed against speech
otherwise within the forum's limitations").
6. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991) ('The Government can, without
violating the Constitution, selectively fund a program to encourage certain activities it
believes to be in the public interest, without at the same time funding an alternative program
which seeks to deal with the problem in another way"); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474
(1977) (stating government may "make a value judgment . .. and to implement that
judgment by the allocation of public funds"); Phillip T. K Daniel & Vesta A. IL Daniel, A
Legal Portraitof the Artist and Art Educatorin Free Expression and Cyberspace, 140 ED.
LAW REP. 431, 454 (describing Rust as "ground-breaking because, for the first time, the
Court affirmed the constitutionality of viewpoint discrimination within the framework of a
federal funding question").
7. See Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 586-87 (1998) (stating
that prohibition against "invidious viewpoint discrimination" applies to government
subsidies but finding no substantial risk that application of the statute at issue would lead to
the suppression of speech); cf. id. at 598-600 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment)
(arguing, contrary to the majority opinion, that viewpoint discrimination in government
funding is entirely permissible).

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 53

very bottom of the free speech barrel.
This uniquely disfavored legal status stands to reason. It is
sufficiently problematic for government to declare that no one can talk
about a certain topic--that is, to regulate speech based on content or
subject matter. To allow some speakers to express an opinion on that topic,
however, while quieting those with any other understanding of the matter
-to regulate speech by viewpoint-strikes one as even worse.
In the first case, although the government suppresses speech, it does
so roundly. Accordingly, no single view of the subject is being promoted
over another. In the latter situation, however, government itself selects and
then protects a particular point of view by permitting its expression while
simultaneously prohibiting any contrary ones. Thus, government does not
just neutralize discussion, but goes the extra step of affirmatively skewing
the discussion in a self-selected direction.8 As Justice Scalia colorfully put
it, the government thereby "license[s] one side of a debate to fight
freestyle, while requiring the other to follow Marquis of Queensbury
rules." 9 Under such circumstances, the contest is fundamentally unfair and
impairs the competition of ideas on the merits.
Is there any more specific reason, though, that the affirmative
promotion of one point of view should be more offensive to the First
Amendment than generally enforced silence? After all, more, not less,
speech results when only one side of a debate is muted, and many consider
more speech to be better than less speech.10
That argument fails to take account of the practical effects of
viewpoint-based rules on the political process. Governmental promotion of
a particular idea creates and active force of public persuasion that does not
exist in the context of subject-matter bans. By picking a side and
prohibiting expression of any other, government thus increases the chances
that undecided citizens will adopt the preferred view and that it will
become or remain binding policy. "
8. See City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 804 (1984) ("T]he First
Amendment forbids the government to regulate speech in ways that favor some viewpoints
or ideas at the expense of others."); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 745-46 (1978)
("Trt is a central tenet of the First Amendment that the government must remain neutral in
the marketplace of ideas."); see also Am. Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 325

(7th Cir. 1985) ("The Constitution forbids the state to declare one perspective right and
silence opponents.").
9. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 392.
10. See MARTiN H. REDISH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: A CRIcAL ANALYSIS 102
(1984) (arguing that laws that reduce the total quantity of available speech should be the

least favored).
11. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WD6. &
MARY L. REv. 189, 198 (1983) ("M'rjhe [F]irst [A]mendment is concerned, not only with the
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This might occur in several ways. When the established thinking on
an issue is favorably presented to the public and then hangs in the ether,

immune from challenge, it is more likely to be perpetuated by sheer force
of social osmosis. That is to say, people might simply assume the
proposition to be true or otherwise uncontestable because no critical views

are even apparent. As Justice Jackson explained, "Progress generally
begins in skepticism about accepted truths.' 2 Yet, when no skepticism can
be expressed, reexamination of established ideas and consideration of new

ones will probably not occur.13 Moreover, when a point of view bears the
official imprimatur of the government, some may take that fact in itself as
proof of the idea's legitimacy. 4
When the entire conversation about a subject is stopped (as
objectionable as that is), there is at least no risk that converts will be won
by one side or the other. The status quo simply persists. This is because no

speech that might persuade can occur, nor is there any question of an
authoritative seal of approval for one side that might influence.
In the battle for public opinion, the ability to win over the undecided

that is conferred by affirmative promotion could result in victory-whether
by winning elections or enacting legislation-in the political process. If
that occurs, the government has not only restricted the free exchange of
ideas by and among individuals, which to some is itself a First Amendment
harm, 5 but its "distort[ion] [of] public debate' " 6 has affected the
substantive outcome of the political process, which is certainly an

extent to which a law reduces the total quantity of communication, but also-and perhaps
even more fundamentally-with the extent to which the law distorts public debate.").
12. Am. Comms. Ass'n, C.I.O., v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 442 (1950) (Jackson, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
13. Hudnut,771 F.2d at 328-29 ("People often act in accordance with the [speech] they
find around them ....
Words... act at the level of the subconscious before they persuade at
the level of the conscious. Even the truth has little chance unless a statement fits within the
framework of beliefs that may never have been subjected to rational study.").
14. See Abner S. Greene, Government of the Good, 53 VAND. L. REv. 1, 44 (2000)
(canvassing arguments that "government speech may be improperly persuasive" because
"people will grant too much deference to the government"; "governmental invocation of
expertise falsely lulls the citizery into assuming a certain consensus"; and "'individuals
may defer to the state's authority, just as we normally wish them to do in the case of general
obedience to the law.") quoting Stephen Gardbaum, Liberalism, Autonomy, and Moral
Conflict,48 STAN. L. REv. 385,398 (1996) (footnotes omitted).
15. See REDISH, supra note 10, at 11-14 (function of First Amendment is to promote
"individual self-realization"); see also Frst Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti,435 U.S. 765, 777 n.12
(1978) ("The individual's interest in self-expression is a concern of the First Amendment
separate from theconcern for open andinformed discussion....').
16. Geoffrey R. Stone, Comment, Anti-Pornography Legislation as ViewpointDiscrimination,9 HARv.J.L. & Pm. PoL'Y 461,464 (1986).
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independent and arguably greater constitutional harm.

III. A VmWPOiNT-NEUTRAL FCC Is NOT Too
MUCH TO ASK FOR
In an ideal world, the FCC would carefully adhere to the abovedescribed, core First Amendment admonition against viewpoint regulation.
To be sure, ideals are often difficult to uphold in the real world. But even as
a practical matter, asking the FCC to observe the ban on viewpoint-based
rules is not demanding too much of the agency. Potential violations of the
ban on viewpoint discrimination are, for the reasons that follow, relatively
easy to identify and avoid. When the agency nonetheless transgresses this
constitutional limit, there is good reason to believe that its regulatory action
is motivated by the impermissible, usually political, purpose of
manipulating public opinion.
A. The IdentificationandAvoidance of Viewpoint-Based Regulation
First, it is relatively simple to assess ex ante the probable legality of

viewpoint-based regulations. The constitutional proscription against such
rules is phrased in categorical terms and draws a far brighter line between9
legal and illegal conduct than do most constitutional standards.1
Viewpoint-based rules are not subject to any intermediate standard of
17. See

ALExANDER MEIK.EIOHN,

FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO SELF-

26 (1948) ("Just so far as, at any point, the citizens who decide an issue are
denied acquaintance with information or opinion or doubt or disbelief or criticism which is
relevant to that issue, just so far the result must be ill-considered, ill-balanced planning for
the general good."); Geoffrey &. Stone, Content-NeutralRestrictions, 54 U. CmH. L. REv.
46, 55 (1986) (Government efforts to eliminate a "particular point of view from public
debate" are harmful because they "mutilate 'the thinking process of the community .......
(quoting ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLrrCALFREEDOM 27 (1960)).
18. Cf. Stone, supra note 16, at 464 (arguing that because "[govemment will rarely
admit... that it is attempting to restrict a particular viewpoint because it disagrees with the
ideas expressed," and because "[tihe risk of improper motivation is especially high in the
context of viewpoint-based restrictions... [where] government officials are especially
likely to be affected ... by their own sympathy or hostility to the particular views sought to
be restricted," courts should "presume improper motivation" but "permit government to
negate that presumption."); see also 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 518
(1996) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (stating that when
the "government's asserted interest is to keep (the public] ignorant in order to manipulate
GovEmENT

their choices[,] ... such an 'interest' is per se illegitimate").

19. Cf. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (observing that "[a] law
'respecting' the... establishment of religion[] is not always easily identifiable as one
violative of the [Establishment] Clause" and setting forth a three-pronged test under that
Clause; the statute first "must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or
primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute
must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with religion."') (internal citations
omitted).

Number 1] COMMUNICATIONS MEDIA, FIRSTAMENDMENT

review, the results of which can be difficult to predict; indeed, they are not
subject to judicial weighing or balancing of any kind. Rather, courts
consider them presumptively unconstitutional20 and thus almost always
strike them down upon a finding that they operate according to the
viewpoint of the regulated parties.2 ' By contrast, even some content-based
restrictions have been sustained under strict scrutiny.
Thus, in the universe of constitutional precepts, the prohibition
against viewpoint-based regulations is about as unambiguous as one can
find. If the FCC has what appears to be a viewpoint-based proposal on its
hands, chances are overwhelmingly good that the regulation is an
unconstitutional one. In such a case, the unlawfulness of the agency's
action is reasonably foreseeable to decisionmakers?
Second, the actual classification of a regulation as viewpoint-based is
not, as constitutionally founded categories go, overly difficult to make. At
this point, it should be acknowledged that, given the flat nature of the ban
on viewpoint-based rules, the force of the prohibition on viewpoint
discrimination turns largely on the categorization of the rule at issue.
Consequently, some might assert that results-oriented lawyers or judges
20. Rosenberger v. Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828 (1995) ("Discrimination against
speech because of its message is presumed to be unconstitutional.") (citing Turner Broad.
Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641-43 (1994)); see also Stone, supra note 16, at 475
("[A]Ithough the Court has never expressly held that [viewpoint-based] restrictions are per
se unconstitutional, one might fairly read that lesson into the actual record of the Court's
decisions.").
21. See e.g., Rosenberger,515 U.S. at 831-37 (finding that state policy was viewpoint
discriminatory and concluding on that ground that the policy violated the Free Speech
Clause); Niemotko v. Maryland., 340 U.S. 268, 272 (1951) (holding that the city council's
denial of a permit for use of a park by Jehovah's Witnesses was based on "dislike for or
disagreement with the Witnesses or their views" and thus violated the Equal Protection
Clause); Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist, 508 U.S. 384, 394 (1993)
(finding that denial to a church of access to school premises discriminated on the basis of
viewpoint and therefore contravened the First Amendment); Schacht v. United States, 398
U.S. 58, 63 (1970) (finding that a statute prohibiting the wearing of an armed forces uniform
in a theatrical production when work "discredit[s]" those forces was viewpointdiscriminatory and therefore an unconstitutional abridgement of speech); Am. Booksellers
Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 325 (7th Cir. 1985) (concluding that an antipomography
ordinance barring depiction of women as "submissive" amounts to viewpoint discrimination
and thus violates the Free Speech Clause); Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v.
Glendening, 954 F. Supp. 1099, 1105 (D. Md. 1997) (finding state policy to be viewpointbased and thus prohibited by the First Amendment).
22. Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992) (upholding under strict scrutiny facially
content-based electioneering law).
23. Cf.Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 335 (1988) (Brennan, 3., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) (noting that "bright-line rule" requiring content neutrality
"provides clear guidance' and thus allows "g]ovemments... [to] ascertain the scope of
impermissible regulation" and "[i]ndividuals ... [to] ascertain the scope of their
constitutional protection!).
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can argue themselves into or out of the viewpoint-based category and, thus,
24
into or out of a violation of the First Amendment. On this view, then,
trying to classify rules as viewpoint-discriminatory is a pointless endeavor.
That might well be true, but a principled, neutral basis for evaluating
these rules can be articulated and applied. Even a regulator who favors a
particular rule for political reasons should want a disinterested assessment
of the First Amendment risks of the rule. After all, no policy likely to be
overturned by the courts (assuming they will neutrally review cases at least
some of the time) is a rational bet for even the most ardent supporter of its
ends. Agencies should have the incentive to try to objectively and correctly
identify potentially viewpoint-based rules.
To do so, one might ask whether the regulations make material
distinctions among regulated entities based on their particular substantive
perspectives on a subject. In other words, viewpoint-based laws "regulateil
26
speech according to whether one supports or opposes a certain action."
More broadly, as the Supreme Court has put it with respect to the search for
general content neutrality, the inquiry would be "whether the government
has adopted a regulation of speech because of disagreement with the
The government's purpose is the controlling
message it conveys.
27
consideration."
As a general illustration, "a law prohibiting all picketing near a
hospital except that involving labor disputes would be a subject matter
restriction, whereas a law allowing picketing in favor of a strike but
prohibiting picketing against a strike would be viewpoint-based." 2 As a
communications-specific example, a regulation prohibiting editorializing
by broadcast stations would materially distinguish regulatees on the ground
24. See, e.g., STANLEY FISH, THERE'S No SUCH THNG AS FREE SPEECH AND IT'S A GOOD
THING, Too 110 (1994) ("[D]ecisions about what is and is not protected in the realm of

expression will rest not on principle or firm doctrine but on the ability of some persons to
interpret-recharacterize or rewrite-principle and doctrine in ways that lead to the
protection of speech they want heard and the regulation of speech that they want silenced.").
25. See H. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARV. L.

Rav. 1, 15 (1959) ("[The main constituent of the judicial process is precisely that it must be
genuinely principled, resting with respect to every step that is involved in reaching judgment
on analysis and reasons quite transcending the immediate result that is achieved."); JOHN
HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AN DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICL. REvIw 112 (1980) ("One
does not have to be a lawyer to recognize that even the clearest legal formula can be

manipulated. But it's a very bad lawyer who supposes that manipulability and infinite
manipulability are the same thing.').
26. Carolyn Wiggin, Note, A Funny Thing Happens When You Pay for a Forum:
Mandatory Student Fees to Support PoliticalSpeech at Public Universities, 103 YALE L.J.
2009,2032 n.115 (1994).

27. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (citation omitted).
28. Wiggin, supra note 26, at 2032.
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of the subject matter (opinions on matters of public importance) that they
air29 A regulation prohibiting not just editorializing but editorializing
against free broadcast time for political candidates would turn on a
regulatee's point of view in the context of that subject matter-namely, the
opinion, on this matter of public policy, that the proposal is a bad idea.
This analytical exercise of identifying viewpoint-discriminatory rules

employs more readily ascertainable concepts (whether one side of a debate
is being advanced over another) and less complicated standards (a unitary

definitional test) than most constitutional inquiries. Compare, by way of
example, the identification of a regulatory taking under the Fifth
Amendment. Such an assessment requires evaluation of the "character" of
the governmental action, its economic impact, and its interference with
reasonable investment-backed expectations 3 -- all this, in light of the lack
of any "set formula' for identifying a taking and the fact that the answer
31
will depend mostly "upon the particular circumstances [in that] case."
Of course, this is not to say that identification of a viewpoint-based

rule is always an easy task.32 One can adduce examples of hard cases that
produce reasonable disagreement. 33 The point is simply that the definition
and classification of a viewpoint-based rule is a fairly straightforward legal
enterprise, as compared to the application of other constitutional standards.
In the broad main of agency business, an objective, competent attorney
ought to be able to apply the definition of "viewpoint discrimination" to

proposed regulations and reach reasonably certain conclusions as to
whether they appear to be viewpoint-based. Again, some degree of agency

error in making this determination is inevitable, as with all legal judgments,
but it is fair to demand less error here than in other constitutional contexts.
Third, the agency seeking to achieve a regulatory goal normally has a
29. See FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984) (involving a federal
statute banning noncommercial broadcast stations from engaging in editorial activities).
30. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
31. Id.; See also Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of New York,
447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980) (stating that the test for regulation of commercial speech asks
whether speech is not misleading and concerns lawful activity; if so, whether the regulation
"directly advances the governmental interest asserted; and whether it is more extensive than
necessary to serve that interest").
32. See Greene, supra note 14, at 32 ('Identifying viewpoint discrimination is
notoriously difficult. There are easy cases, of course-it is clearly viewpoint discrimination
to prohibit speech opposed to the Mayor but to permit speech supporting him-the Court's
treatment of this area has been unsatisfactory.'); Heins, supranote 2, at 103 ("The concept
of viewpoint neutrality in First Amendment jurisprudence has.., been confusing in both
definition and application. .. !).
33. See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 191-200 (stating that regulations barring
abortion counseling in federally funded facilities are not viewpoint-discriminatory); id. at
207-12 (Blackmun, 3., dissenting) (regulations are clearly viewpoint-based).
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wide range of less speech-restrictive alternatives to viewpoint-based
regulations. So long as the agency is really not seeking to muffle certain
ideas, it usually should be unnecessary to pursue a viewpoint-based
scheme.
In the event that neutral review discloses a potentially viewpointbased rule, decisionmakers should consider these alternative means of
achieving their regulatory ends, thereby minimizing and perhaps avoiding
the constitutional issue altogether. For instance, they could opt for
issue.34
regulation of the instrumentalities of communications at
Alternatively, they might take aim at the35 underlying conduct, instead of
regulating speech about the conduct itself.
Regulators might also look for some reasonable proxy for the actual
target of the regulation. For example, instead of reviewing programming to
see whether it is educational, one might check to see whether the entity that
created the programming is officially accredited as an educational
institution or plans to serve such an institution.36 Instead of reviewing
programming to see whether it presents a "local" perspective on an issue,
another proxy approach would ask where the programming was produced
in relation to its place of broadcast. 37 Although such "proxy" approaches
are not themselves free from constitutional doubt,38 they are less suspect
than direct review of the substance of a message and therefore better
advised.

34. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 533(f)(1)(A) (1994) (limiting number of subscribers that
persons owning cable systems may reach); Time Warner Entm't Co. v. United States, 211
F.3d 1313, 1318 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (upholding subscriber limit as content-neutral regulation
of cable industry).
35. See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484,507 (1996) (explaining
that, instead of imposing an unconstitutional ban on advertising of liquor prices, the state
could have adopted less speech-restrictive measures to promote temperance, such as capping

per capita purchases of the product.
36. See, e.g., In re Applications of North Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found.,

Inc., Henderson, Nevada, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 12 F.C.C.R. 21,552, para. 2
(1997) (certifying, pursuant to 47 C.F.R. §§ 74.932(a)(l)-(5), Catholic organization is
eligible for instructional television fixed-service license on the grounds that it "submitted a
statement of its educational purpose and proposes to serve students enrolled at accredited
institutions").
37. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 336(f)(2)(A)(i)(E) (West 2000) (requiring low-power television
stations eligible for primary status to "broadcast an average of at least three hours per week
of programming that was produced within the market area served by such station, or the
market area served by a group of commonly controlled low-power stations that carry

common local programming produced within the market area served by such group').
38. See, e.g., Rice v. Cayetano, 120 S.Ct. 1044, 1055 (2000) (invalidating a state statute
classifying voters on the basis of "ancestry" because the category was "a proxy for [the
constitutionally suspect category of] race").
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B. An Agency PolicyAgainst DiscretionaryViewpoint
Discrimination
The surest way to prevent viewpoint discrimination, however, is to

avoid content-based regulation in the first place. Viewpoint regulation is, at
bottom, simply a species of content regulation.39 Scrubbing the Code of
FederalRegulations of all content-based rules would be the safest method
of minimizing tension with the First Amendment, including its proscription

on viewpoint regulations. Admittedly, this is not a practical solution, as
some amount of content-based regulation
is statutorily required and the
40
Commission thus must promulgate it.
What the FCC can and should do, however, is eschew venturing into
issues that involve the supposed validity of certain messages or beliefs
when it is under no statutory obligation to do so. Specifically, the FCC
should formally adopt an internal regulatory policy of constitutional
avoidance, analogous to the judicial canon of statutory construction in
favor of constitutional avoidance.41 The policy would hold that unless
Congress has clearly mandated that the Commission regulate on the basis
of either content or views, the FCC will decline to exercise any discretion
that it might arguably have to fashion rules that do so. Such a policy would
promote administrative restraint with respect to viewpoint-based rules and

thereby a viewpoint-neutral, truly First Amendment-friendly Commission.
39. See Rosenberger v. Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 830-31 (1995) ("[D]iscrimination
against one set of views or ideas is but a subset or particular instance of the more general
phenomenon of content discrimination.").
40. 47 U.S.C. § 303b(a)(2) (1994) ("[tlhe Commission shall, in its review of any
application for renewal of a commercial or noncommercial television broadcast license,
consider the extent to which the licensee... has served the educational and informational
needs of children through the licensee's overall programming, including programrming
specifically designed to serve such needs.").
41. Cf. Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades
Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988) ("[w]here an otherwise acceptable construction of a
statute would raise serious constitutional problems, the Court will construe the statute to
avoid such problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of
Congress."). Indeed, the theory behind this judicial canon of construction applies with even
greater force to independent administrative agencies. The canon is premised in part on the
respect of the federal judiciary for a co-equal, coordinate branch of government; courts will
not presume that Congress intended to act in an unconstitutional fashion and thus read its
statutes to avoid that conclusion. See id. ('This approach... recognizes that Congress, like
this Court, is bound by and swears an oath to uphold the Constitution. The courts will
therefore not lightly assume that Congress intended to infringe constitutionally protected
liberties or usurp power constitutionally forbidden it."). Independent agencies-whatever
their proper rank in the constitutional hierarchy of federal government, see Morrison v.
Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988)--certainly are not on an equal constitutional footing with
Congress. Thus, agencies such as the FCC should show Congress at least as much and
probably more regard in interpreting federal laws than do Article fIr courts.
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IV. CASE STUDIES OF A VIEWPOINT-BASED COMMBISSION
Notwithstanding a good amount of rhetoric extolling the virtues of the
First Amendment, 42 the current Commission has not taken a viewpointneutral approach to regulation, as described above. To the contrary, in two
particularly notable cases, the FCC directly involved itself in the regulation
of points of view absent any express congressional directive to do so. These
cases illustrate the serious constitutional problems that the Commission
manufactures when it regulates not just on the basis of content at the
express behest of Congress, but goes even further into the area of viewpoint
regulation based on discretionary or ambiguous statutory authority.
A.

WQED Order

On December 29, 1999, the FCC released a decision approving the
transfer of a radio license from television station WQED in Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania, to Cornerstone TeleVision, Inc 3 The Commission found
that Comerstone-a religious broadcasting entity-met the legal standard
for operating on the noncommercial, educational ("NCE") band. That
standard requires that the "station[]... be used primarily to serve the
educational needs of the community" and "for the advancement of
educational programs." 44 In applying this standard, the Commission
deferred, as it traditionally had done, to the good faith judgment of the
broadcaster that its station would serve educational purposes. 45
The Commission did not stop there, however. In a further statement
designed to provide broadcasters with "additional guidance," the
Commission elaborated on the situations in which religious programming
would be deemed "primarily educational" for purposes of licensing on the
NCE band. The Commission said:
First, with respect to the overall weekly program schedule, more than
half of the hours of programming aired on a reserved channel must
primarily serve an educational, instructional or cultural purpose in the
station's community of license. Second, in order to qualify as a
42. See, e.g., Separate Statement of Commissioner Gloria Tristani, In the Matter of
Creation of Low Power Radio Serv., Report and Order, 15 F.C.C.R. 2205, 2327 (2000)

( Under the First Amendment,... the answer is more speech not less"); In the Matter of
Review of the Comm'n's Regulations Governing Television Broad., Report and Order, 14
F.C.C.R. 12,903, para. 17, 17 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1 (1999) (The "[g]oal" of "the First
Amendment" is to "foster I] the marketplace of ideas and encourag[e] uninhibited, robust,

and wide-open debate." (internal quotations and citations omitted).
43. In re Applications of WQED Pittsburgh, Assignor, and Cornerstone TeleVision,
Inc., Assignee, Order, 15 F.C.C.R. 202, 19 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 214 (1999) [hereinafter
WQED, Order].
44. 47 C.F.R. § 73.621 (1999).
45. WQED, Order,supranote 43, para 42.
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program which is educational, instructional or cultural in character,
and thus counted in determining compliance with the overall
benchmark standard, a program must have as its primary purpose
service to the educational, instructional or cultural needs of the

community.

6

On this second point, the Commission elaborated that:
[n]ot all programming, including programming about religious matters,
qualifies as "general educational" programming. For example,
programmingprimarilydevoted to religiousexhortation,proselytizing,
or statements of personally-held religious views and beliefs generally
would not qualify as "general educational"programming.... [T]he
reserved television channels are intended "to serve the educational and
cultural broadcast needs of the entire community to which they are
assigned," and to be responsive to the overall public as opposed to the
sway of particular political, economic, social or religious interests. 47

This "additional guidance" purported to regulate not just the subject
matter of religion in making the determination of NCE status. Rather, it
purported to regulate on the basis of the speaker's point of view about

religion. Specifically, the FCC would examine whether a "statement of
religious views" was "personally held" or not. As among statements on
religion, those that expressed personal belief in the truth of a religious

message would not qualify as "educational," while those that did not would
so qualify. a

46. Id. para 43.
47. Id. para. 44 quoting Fostering Expanded Use of UHF Television Channels, Fifth
Report andMemorandum Opinionand Order,2 F.C.C.2d 527, para. 41, 6 Rad. Reg.2d (P &

F) 1643 (1966).
48. Following legislative and public criticism of its "additional guidance," the
Commission quickly repealed that portion of the WQED Order.See In re Applications of
WQED Pittsburgh, Assignor, and Cornerstone TeleVision, Inc., Assignee, Order on
Reconsideration, 15 F.C.C.R. 2534, 19 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 241 (2000) [hereinafter
ReconsiderationOrder]. The Reconsideration Order, however, did not disturb either the
"educational" requirement of section 73.621 or the Commission's general principle that
religious programming may be educational but it is not always so. See WQED, Order,supra
note 43, paras. 18, 21. Moreover, the Reconsideration Order did not confess error in
repealing the "firther guidance," but relied instead on the "[un]certainty" created by that
language. Reconsideration Order, para 2. Furthermore, the Reconsideration Order was
silent on the continuing validity of the agency precedent on which the Commission
purportedy based the guidance. See WQED, Order, supra note 43, para 23. Finally, the
ReconsiderationOrderwas also mute on the related question whether the Commission will
continue what it claimed was an established de facto practice of engaging in direct review of
religious programming. See Letter from Chairman William E. Kennard to Rep. Michael G.
Oxley, Jan. 12, 2000, at www.fcc.gov/Speeches/Kennard/Statemetns/2000/stwek003.doc
("[t]he Commission's decision in [the WQED] case... does not establish new rules but
simply clarifies long-standing FCC policy.").
As members of Congress concluded in introducing the Noncommercial
Broadcasting Freedom of Expression Act of 2000, the current state of the law in this area,
therefore, is highly ambiguous. See The Religious Broad Freedom Act and the

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 53

The WQED Orderwould seem to be a textbook example of viewpoint
discrimination 4 9 On its face, the Order materially distinguished among
regulatees on the basis of their positions, pro or con, on an identifiable
subject. Specifically, "I believe (and you should too)" was a viewpoint on

religion that disqualified a program from being deemed "educational,"
whereas "I do not believe (and you need not either)" was a permissible
"educational" message.

In this regulatory model, the Commission "[did] not exclude religion
as a subject matter but select[ed] for disfavored treatment those [regulatees)
. . . with . . . [a certain] viewpointfl"--that of personal belief--on
religion. 50 By the terms of the Order, it was "[t]he prohibited perspective,
not the general subject matter" that would have "resulted in the refusal to"

grant NCE status."' In view of the virtually per se prohibition on viewpointdiscriminatory rules, the Commission's "personal belief' test for
designating those speakers on religion who could operate on the reserved
band appears to be a clear infringement of speech freedom.52

Faced with Cornerstone's proposal to air religious programming on
the NCE band, the Commission could have taken either of two less
restrictive approaches than that described above. First, the Commission
NoncommercialBroad Freedomof ExpressionAct of 2000: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Telecomm, Trade, and Consumer Protectionof the House Comm. on Commerce, 106th
Cong. 2 (2000) (statement of Rep. W. J. "Billy" Tauzin) (noting vacature of additional
guidance but stating "there is still cause for concern"); Id. at 4 ("[Ilt is my strong opinion
that the FCC Orderon Reconsiderationdoes not put this matter to rest.") (statement of Rep.
Oxley); see also id. at 19 ("Tllhe Commission's action [on reconsideration] still leaves
religious broadcasters who seek to operate on noncommercial educational channels in a
quandary.") (statement of Mark Dreistadt, Vice President, Cornerstone TeleVision). H.R.
4201 passed the House on June 20, 2000, but never came to a vote in the Senate. The
ambiguity of the Commission's position on the educational nature of religious programming
that "proselytizes" persists, and the issue is of continuing relevance for religious
broadcasters.
49. Although it is true that "of all forms of communication, it is broadcasting that has
received the most limited First Amendment protection," FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S.
726, 748 (1978), no Supreme Court case has suggested that the government may regulate
that industry in a viewpoint-discriminatory way. Indeed, FCC v. League of Women Voters,
468 U.S. 364 (1984), which struck down a statute barring NCE stations from engaging in
editorializing, held that content-based restrictions on core speech of broadcasters are invalid,
notwithstanding a generally reduced First Amendment scrutiny. Moreover, under RAV. v
City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992), which barred content- and viewpoint-discrimination
in the context of wholly unprotected speech, broadcast speech, which enjoys some
protection, ought to be similarly immune from viewpoint-based regulation.
50. Rosenberger v. Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 831 (1995).
51. Id
52. See supra note 21 (citing cases establishing bar against viewpoint discrimination);
see also FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984) (striking down statute
barring NCE stations receiving federal grants from engaging in editorializing).
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might have reconsidered the elements of licensing on the reserved band to
eliminate the root problem: the content-based requirement that the station
be used for "educational" purposes. This option has its logistical
difficulties, given the settled expectations of those already on the band, but
it certainly represents a legal possibility for avoiding direct FCC inspection
of religious programming for educational worth. Second, the Commission
could have adhered to its policy of deferring to the good faith judgment of
the broadcaster that the station will serve educational ends. 53 That policy
had the constitutionally significant advantage of taking the Commission out
of the business of first-order review of religious programming.
Finally, the Commission was under no statutory obligation to draw
the problematic lines that it did in order to allocate the license at issue. The
Communications Act of 1934 ("1934 Act") does not specifically call for
partial reservation of the spectrum for "noncommercial educational"
television programming; rather, the Commission made that designation on
the basis of its general discretionary management power5 As the
"educational" element of the NCE licensing standard is not statutorily
required, the Commission's additional review of religious programming for
"educational" status is likewise not compelled by the 1934 Act.
The constitutional problem in the WQED Order was of the
Commission's own making.55 As described above, it could easily have been
53. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.621 (1999).
54. See Amendment of Section 3.606 of the Comm'n's Rules and Regulations;
Amendment of the Comm'n's Rules, Regulations and Engineering Standards Concerning
the Television Broad. Serv.; Utilization of Frequencies in the Band 470 to 890 MCS. For
Television Broad., Sixth Report and Order,41 F.C.C. 148 (1952) (reserving 242 channels
for NCE television service, an exercise of general licensing power); see also WQED, Order,
supra note 43, at 211 n.21 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 303, which gives the Commission power to
"[c]lassify radio stations" and "prescribe the nature of the services to be rendered by each
class" of stations, as a source of authority for NCE television allocations); but see 47 C.F.R.
§ 73.606 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 155, governing "[o]rganization and [flunctioning of the
Commission," as authority for table of channel allotments designating channels for
exclusive NCE use).
55. Nor was the Commission under a constitutional obligation to exclude "statements of
personally held beliefs" from NCE programming, as it suggested. See Reconsideration
Order, supra note 48, at 2540 (Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Gloria Tristani)
(arguing that "a government policy that endorses certain sectarian programming as
'educational,' and awards exclusive use of a scarce resource to permit those views to be
expressed, would run afoul of the Establishment Clause"). Rosenberger squarely held that
government does not violate the Establishment Clause when it acts to avoid viewpoint
discrimination against religious speakers:
[Viewpoint discrimination that] require[s] public officials to scan and interpret
[material] to discern [its] underlying philosophic assumptions respecting religious
theory and belief [is a] denial of the right to free speech and would risk fostering a
pervasive bias or hostility to religion, which could undermine the very neutrality
the Establishment Clause requires. There is no Establishment Clause violation in
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avoided. The fact that the Commission issued the Order in the form that it

did suggests that it was motivated by an inappropriate, philosophical
hostility toward those who believe and advocate belief in-i.e. those who
evangelize about-their religious views. 6 While such beliefs may be
controversial and even abhorrent to some, the "bedrock principle
underlying the First Amendment . . . is that the government may not
prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea
itself offensive or disagreeable."

B. Truth-in-BillingRegulations
In the May 1999 Order entitled "Truth-in-Billing," the Commission
decided to require telephone companies to use standardized labels on
customer bills to describe certain charges." These labels apply to, among
the [government's] honoring its duties under the Free Speech Clause.
Rosenberger,515 U.S. at 845-46; see also Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch.

Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 393-94 (1993) (denying church access to school premises to exhibit
film series violates the Freedom of Speech Clause).
56. This suggestion is reflected in the record, which bubbles hotly beneath the surface
of the proceeding. The parties in opposition to the license transfer focused their criticism of
Cornerstone's "educational" status on the particular "fundamentalist Christian," Comments
of Alvin Rosensweet (June 6, 1997), and "politically conservative," Comments of Nancy
Lapp (July 18, 1999), messages in its programming. See Pet. to Den., Alliance for
Progressive Action and QED Accountability Project (filed July 7, 1997), app. A, Dec. of
Linda Flower at 2 (June 23, 1997) (objecting to program entitled "Crisis in the Classroom"
because it "criticize[s] whole language learning"); Decl. of Mark Ginsburg at 2 (June 30,
1997) ("Crisis in the Classroom" is not educational because it contains anti-federal
government rhetoric" and "argues that values and knowledge are 'absolutes' and not
relativistic"); Decl. of Anthony S. Silvestre at 3 (June 29, 1997) ("Coral Ridge Ministries
Hour" does not educate because it "driaws] the conclusion that people can change their
sexual orientation'); Decl. of Michael Schneider at 1-2 (June 30, 1997) ("Behind the Green
Curtain" is not NCE programming because it "argues single-mindedly that the
environmental movement is a conspiracy of wealthy elites to curtail property rights" and
"proclaims... that global warming is a myth"); id. at 2 ("Origins" is unqualified
programming because it "promotes 'Creation Science' and attacks evolution"); Consol. Rep.
to Opp'ns to Pet. to Den., Alliance for Progressive Action and QED Accountability Project
(filed Aug. 7, 1997), Attachment C, Declaration of Monsignor Charles Rice ("Father
Manning" program should not be deemed educational because it "was "concerned... with
the abortion issue and presented an uncompromising stand"). Parties also opposed the
transfer based on the identity of the messengers. See Pet. in Opp'n, app. C, Decl. of Mark
Ginsburg at 1 (June 30, 1997) ("That ['Crisis in the Classroom'] was produced by Phyllis
Schlafly's Eagle Forum... reinforces my conclusion that the program "has limited or no
educational value"); id. app. I, Comments of Ann Sutherland Harris at 2 (Aug. 20, 1996)
(arguing against station sale because "the Christian Coalition" would replace current
management and Pittsburgh's "television and radio are being taken over by anti-laborconservative-Republicans"); Comments of Stuart Hastings (Aug. 8, 1999) ("I fear the
increased prominence of Pat Robertson and his ilk on the local TV scene.").
57. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397,414 (1989).
58. Truth-in-Billing and Billing Format, FirstReport and Orderand FurtherNotice of
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other things, the cost associated with the Commission's "schools and
libraries" program. That program requires telephone companies to
"contribute' over $2 billion to a federal fund to pay for the connection of
school classrooms and libraries to the Internet.59
The standardized labeling requirement was adopted in the wake of
public criticism of the charge, dubbed "the Gore tax" by its opponents
based on the Vice President's strong support of the program. 0 That
controversy was generated by the decision of some telephone companies to
break the charge out as a separate line-item on customer bills, making it
noticeable to the consumer, and to tie responsibility for the charge to the
FCC.6' Previously, the charges had been rolled into rates. One
Commissioner, reflecting the Commission's widely noted displeasure,6 2
remarked, "Carriers better sharpen their pencils and think twice about what
they're putting on customer's bills and attributing to government action."6'3
Industry
countered: "They don't want us to call it a tax... but that's what
''
it is.6
Thereafter, the Commission issued the Truth-in-Billing Order,which
provides that "carriers [must] identify line item charges associated with
federal regulatory action through a standard industry-wide label and
provide full, clear and non-misleading descriptions of the nature of the
charges."65 Although required to use the prescribed labels, carriers were
still permitted "to include additional language further describing the
charges."6 Significantly, only "line-item charges associated with federal
regulatory actions [were required to] be identified through standard and
ProposedRulemaking, 14 F.C.C.R. 7492, 15 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 912 (1999) [hereinafter
Truth-in-Billing, Order].
59. In the Matter of Fed.-State Joint Bd. on Universal Serv., Report and Order, 12
F.C.C.R. 8776,7 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 109 (1997).
60. John F. Dickerson & Karen Tumulty, Gore's Costly High Wire Act, TnM, May 25,
1998, at 52 ("[The Vice President's] biggest high-tech achievement to date is a program to
wire every classroom and library in the country.... But right now, the program is under
assault from Congress as an out-of-control entitlement engineered by an out-of-control

bureaucracy ....
Critics are already calling it the Gore Tax.").
61. Id. ("[S]tarting this summer, phone companies that were ordered to pay for the
program are threatening to add a new charge to the long-distance bills of residential
consumers.").
62. See Steve Rosenbush, AT&T Adding Surcharges; FCCFurious, USA TODAY, May
29, 1998 at 2B ("The FCC is livid:).
63. Mike Mills, Some MCI Customers Seeing Surge in Phone Bills, WASH. POST,Jan.
31, 1998, atH3.
64. James K Glassman, A New Tax ForThe New Year, WASH. POST, Dec. 2, 1997, at
A27. See Truth-in-Billing, Order, supra note 58, at 7569 (full description of regulation
history given in Commissioner Harold W. Furchtgott-Roth's Dissenting Statement).
65. Truth-in-Billing, Order,supranote 58, para.50.

66. Id. para.56.

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 53

uniform labels across the country."6 7 The Commission expressly declined
to require standardized labels for any other sort of billing description."
The Commission tentatively concluded that the following label should
be used on bills "to refer to" the schools and libraries fee: "Federal
Universal Service."6 9 Any additional language describing the charge must
be "factually accurate and non-misleading" with regard to "the nature and
origin of [the] universal service charge." 70 Specifically, the Commission
made clear that it "would not consider a description of that charge as being
'mandated' by the Commission or the federal government to be accurate. ' 71
This was so, the Commission said, because carriers passed the costs of their
contribution through to customers as a matter of choice-the program did
not regulate recovery of the costs imposed on carriers. 72
Standardized labels and agency oversight of additional descriptions
were necessary, the Commission said, to prevent "consumer confusion"
over charges assessed "ostensibly to recover costs incurred as a result of
specific government action." 73 Uniform labels would also help consumers
comparison shop among carriers on the basis of the amount of the charge
because "[s]uch comparisons are very
difficult when carriers choose
74
different names for the same charge."
Like the WQED decision, the Truth-in-Billing Order exemplifies
viewpoint-based regulation. The Commission did not ban separate lineitems for this "charge associated with federal regulatory action," as it might
have done by requiring the charge to be included in rates or in a unitary
federal line item, thus preventing any speech about the charge. In other
words, the FCC did not effect a subject-matter prohibition. Instead, the
Commission picked out a particular description of the charge-one
indicating that it was ordered by the Commission or the federal
government-and prohibited the expression of that point of view on the
origin of the charge. Conversely, the Commission permitted descriptions
suggesting that carriers are responsible for the charge.
67. Id. para. 54.
68. Id. para. 41-43 ("[With respect to charges for services], [w]e do not prescribe any
particular method of presentation, organization, or language, but rather encourage carriers to
be innovative in designing bills that provide clear descriptions of services rendered .... We
believe the industry is better equipped than the Commission to develop, in conjunction with
consumer focus groups, standardized descriptions...
69. Id para. 71.
70. IL para. 56.
71. Id. para. 56

72. I73. Id. para. 49.
74. 1L para. 54; see also ia para. 49 (advocating the use of standardized labels on
monthly service bills).
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In short, the regulations operate to enjoin the articulation of one side
of an issue, while permitting the opposite. By choosing the very words that
may be used to label federal charges, these regulations "attempt to give one
side of a debatable public question"--here, the government's own view
about who should be held responsible
for these charges--"an advantage in
' 75
expressing its view to the people.
Although the Commission acted on the basis of its authority over
"unjust or unreasonable" carrier practices 6 and suggested that carriers were
untruthful in their characterizations of the charge, the proscribed speech
concerns opinions on matters of public interest more than it does
objectively unreasonable or unfair behavior. As Commissioner FurchtgottRoth noted in dissent:
the assignment of responsibility for these consumer charges seems less
a question of pure fact or 'truth" than opinion. As with most questions
of opinion, it is one about which reasonable people can disagree. Some
carriers possess a reasonable belief that the Commission, by levying a
fee on carriers, was the "but-for" cause of the appearance of these
charges on consumers' bills. In a competitive market, they say, costs
are by definition passed through to consumers, and so the imposition
of new regulatory charges on carriers is tantamount to a charge on
consumers. As long as the carriers are subject to the Commission's
understanding of "misleading" statements with respect to the charges,
however, they will presumably be forbidden by this agency from
expressing to consumers their view that the fees imposed in connection
with the universal service fund are the result of government action and
that ultimate responsibility for these charges rests with the
government.r

Thus, contrary to the argument of the Commission,78 this is not like
regulating the accuracy of certain aspects of advertising or the disclosure of
interest rates. Rather, this is regulation of views on matters of public
interest: social policy, taxation, and ultimate accountability for federally
based fees. If a telephone company believes that the schools and libraries
fee exists because of the actions of the FCC and that the charge should thus
be described as "FCC-mandated," that verbiage is not a demonstrably
untrue statement of fact, but rather the expression of an opinion on a public

75. Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 50 (1994). See also Truth-in-Billing, Order, supra

note 58, at 7581-88 (Comm'r. Furchtgott-Roth, dissenting) (arguing that the regulations are
also invalid under commercial speech doctrine).
76. 47 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1994).
77. Truth-in-Billing, Order,supranote 58, at 7580.
78. Id. para. 63 (analogizing truth-in-billing rules to the Truth in Lending Act, which
requires creditors to accurately disclose financed amounts and interest rates).
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issue.79

The Commission had obvious alternatives to prescribing the actual
words used to describe the charge to accomplish its asserted goals. Again,
as Commissioner Furchtgott-Roth in dissent observed:
[I]f ensuring that consumers can compare universal service charges
across bills is the goal here, that aim could be fully achieved by a rule
requiring standardization and nothing more. For instance, industry
could agree to a certain phrase, and the Commission could simply
require or encourage uniform usage of that phrase. Indeed, the
Commission takes just that sort of non-interventionist approach to
speech with respect to charges for services rendered. ... Given the
stated goal of price comparison, there is no ostensible reason-other
than suppression of the point of view that the charge is a federal fee or
even tax for which the government should be held accountable-that
the Commission itself would need to select or approve the words that
can be used to describe universal service charges. That extra step is
simply not necessary to serve the putative goal of uniformity.
To the extent that the Commission is concerned that certain
characterizations of the charges (specifically, those suggesting the
charges are required by the government) will in fact "mislead"
consumers into the decision not to price shop, the regulations are more
burdensome than necessary to serve that goal as well. Instead of
forbidding all speech except that which appears on its final list, the
Commission could have allowed carriers to speak but prohibited
misleading statements; that is, the presumption could have been in
favor of speech, not against it. Case-by-case adjudication of the
"truthfulness" of specific phrases used to describe the charges would
be vastly less intrusive than the expansive, prophylactic rules adopted
in today. [For] the Commission's selection of a particular label or
labels necessarily excludes a vast category of entirely truthful,
nontisleading ways of describing the charges on line items ...
Moreover, the direct approach of regulating the underlying
conduct-as opposed to the indirect approach of regulating speech
about the conduct-is also presumably available to the Commission. If
the Commission believes that the cost of the universal service program
should be borne by carriers alone, or that any charges that are passed
on should be allocated equitably, then it could (assuming statutory
authority) have regulated carriers' recovery of the cost of these
charges.
Finally, the Commission could have issued public notices or bulletins
to increase public awareness of [its view of] the nature of the charges.
79. Cf Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323,339-40 (1974) (distinguishing "an opinion," the
correction of which "depends not on the conscience ofjudges and juries, but on the
competition of other ideas," from "the intentional lie" or "careless error," which has "no
constitutional value"); Greenbelt Coop. Publ'g. Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 14 (1970)
(holding that "rhetorical hyperbole" in political debate, as opposed to knowing misstatement
of fact, is fully protected under the Frst Amendment).

Number 1] COMMUNICATIONS MEDIA, FIRSTAMENDMENT
It could have explained publicly its view that universal service charges

are imposed directly on carriers, that transfer of the costs to consumers
is a "business choice" for carriers and that consumers should use this
information in evaluating carriers.
The Commission never considered any of these viewpoint-neutral options,
however.
As in the context of the WQED Order,the Commission adopted these
constitutionally suspect rules in the absence of an express congressional
command to do so. Section 201(b) of the 1934 Act, which the Commission
relied upon as authority to issue the requirements, grants the agency power
to regulate "unjust and unreasonable... charges, practices, classifications
... for and in connection with [interstate or foreign communication by wire
or radio] service."8 That language does not compel the Commission to
choose the names of charges on line-items and control the text of additional
descriptions. As noted above, there were many ways for the Commission to
achieve its purported ends short of mandating government-selected labels.
While section 201(b) can be read to confer statutory authority over billing
practices, the particular means adopted by the Commission were certainly
not dictated by section 201. Once more, the Commission unnecessarily and
unfortunately engendered a direct conflict with the principle of viewpointneutrality.
In light of the array of viewpoint-neutral approaches to
standardization of the schools and libraries charge and the statutory latitude
to take those approaches, the fact that the Commission nonetheless imposed
a direct restraint on words used to identify the charge is strong evidence
that its motives related not to consumer confusion 2 but to dampening
speech about a politically controversial program for which it has been
heavily criticized. 3

80. Truth-in-Billing, Order,supranote 58, at 7586-88.
81. 47 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1994).
82. Indeed, as Commissioner Furchtgott-Roth's dissent pointed out, there was no
recorded evidence of public confusion about labels used for the schools and libraries fee,
because no such labels had even been employed. See Truth-in-Billing Order,supranote 58,
at 7585 (Comm'r. Furchtgott-Roth, dissenting). At the time that the Orderwas adopted,
telephone companies had only announced their intention to break out the charge on bills. Id.
at7576.
83. Relatedly, the fact that the Commission required uniform government-approved
terminology only for this federal charge, and not for state charges or any services,
substantially undermines its claim that such labels are necessary to achieve its goals. With
the same aims in mind, and without explaining the different result, the Commission thought
it sufficient in these other contexts to allow for flexibility in nomenclature. See supra note
67.
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V. CONCLUSION
While some legal violations are perhaps difficult to avoid because of
the murkiness of the relevant standard and thus excusable on the part of
agency administrators, that is not, as this Article has argued, the case with
respect to viewpoint discrimination. Because the rule against viewpoint
discrimination is relatively uncomplicated to understand and apply, as
compared to constitutional rules generally, FCC violations can and should
be minimized-especially where there is no statutory duty to regulate with
an eye toward viewpoint. The WQED and Truth-in-Billing Orders serve as

prime examples of the sort of viewpoint-based regulation that the current
Commission could and should have averted. If we can fairly expect
anything from the FCC, which possesses primary regulatory jurisdiction
over so many modes of communication, it is that this agency steer clear of
the First Amendment's core ban on viewpoint discrimination.

